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Licensing Impact of Foreign Policy Motivated
Retroactive Reexport Regulations
by Brian G. Brunsvold*
James M. Bagarazzit
T he subject of licensing agreements which transfer technology devel-
oped in the United States to companies organized under the laws of
Western Europe and Japan seldom has warranted front-page newspaper
coverage. An exception occurred when the President of the United States
unilaterally imposed1 foreign-policy motivated, retroactively effective
reexport 2 regulations.3 These regulations impaired licenses transferring
* Partner, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner of Washington, D.C.
t Associate, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner of Washington, D.C.
I The imposition of the restrictions was stated to be pursuant to the authority con-
ferred upon the President by the Export Administration Act of 1979 [hereinafter cited as
EAA '79] Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. IV
1980)). The EAA '79 traces its lineage to the Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, Pub. L. No.
81-11, 63 Stat. 7 (expired 1969) through the Export Administration Act of 1969 [hereinafter
cited as EAA '69], Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. 11, 91 Stat. 1625); the Equal Export Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No.
92-412, 86 Stat. 644 (1972) (expired 1979) and the Export Administration Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 93-500, 88 Stat. 1552.
The EAA '79 expires by its own terms [EAA '79 § 20; 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 (Supp. IV
1980)] on September 30, 1983. Since the withdrawal of the June Regulations, several bills
have been introduced in both houses of Congress regarding the reenactment of the EAA '79.
As this paper was sent to the publisher, it was unclear which, if any, of these bills would be
enacted into law. Provisions of some of these bills are discussed in later footnotes.
2 The term "reexport" will be used in this paper to describe the following two
circumstances:
(1) After having been exported from the United States to a first foreign country,
the identical exported good or technical information is then "reexported" (the
reexported item itself thereby becoming a "reexport") from the first foreign coun-
try to a second foreign country, or (2) after having been exported from the United
States to a first foreign country, the exported good is incorporated into a second
good, or a second good or service is produced in accordance with the exported
technical information, and the second good or service is then "reexported" from
the first foreign country to a second foreign country.
3 Specifically, the regulations in question, 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (1982) (repealed 1982)
[hereinafter cited as either the December export regulations or the December regulations]
and 47 Fed. Reg. 27, 250 (1982) (repealed 1982) [hereinafter cited as either the June reex-
port regulations or the June regulations], were promulgated under § 6 of the EAA '79; 50
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U.S.-origin technology to Western Europe and Japan for use in connec-
tion with the Soviet natural gas pipeline under construction between Si-
beria and Western Europe. This paper undertakes a discussion of the le-
gality of these regulations, their practical impact on licensing, the
remedies available to parties to licenses impaired by such regulations, and
suggests precautions to be taken in future licensing agreements to protect
against similar regulations. Also explored, in light of the issues of extra-
territorial jurisdiction, retroactive impairment of licensing agreements,
and considerations of international comity, is the desirability of providing
broad export control powers to the President for use in achieving foreign-
policy goals, as opposed to use in affecting national-security re-
quirements.
I. BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVES
A. The Export Control System4
The export of goods, services and technical information from the
United States is controlled by a system of export licenses.5 The adminis-
tration of the export licensing system of the United States is entrusted to
the Office of the President," which has delegated authority in this area to
the Department of Commerce.7
U.S.C. § 2405 (Supp. IV 1980).
4 For a comprehensive treatment of foreign-policy export controls, see Abbott, Linking
Trade to Political Goals: Foreign Policy Export Controls in the 1970s and 1980s, 65 MNN.
L. REv. 739 (1981); Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States
Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRNSNAT'L L. 439 (1981);
Brunsvold & Ortolani, Pitfalls in Licensing-Export Control Regulations and Patent Office
Security Procedures, 3 LICENSING LAw AND BusiNmss REPORT, Nos. 3 & 4 (1980); and
Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and Future, 67 COLUM.
L. R-v. 791, 808-09 (1967).
Export licenses are permissions from the government. They are to be distinguished
from technology transfer licenses, which are agreements between private parties governing
the transfer of technical information. Export licenses authorize the movement of goods, ser-
vices or technical information across the borders of the United States to foreign destina-
tions. The December export regulations, supra note 3, did not withdraw retroactively such
permission regarding the movement of U.S.-origin goods, services or technical information
from the United States via a foreign country to the ultimate destination of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. The June reexport regulations, supra note 3, withdrew retroac-
tively such permission regarding the movement of U.S.-origin goods, services or technical
information from one foreign country to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics..
6 EAA '79, supra note 1, at § 4(e) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(e) (Supp. IV
1980)).
7 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,214, 45 Fed. Reg. 29,783 (1980) (delegation to the Secre-
tary of Commerce of the President's power to regulate exports in the interest of foreign
policy). See Organization and Function Order, Assistant Secretary for Trade Administra-
tion, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,582-88 (1982), for further delegations of authority within the Coin-
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Most exports leave the country under the provisions of a general li-
cense in effect at the time of export. However, a significant number of
exports require validated licenses. The criteria for issuance of validated
licenses reflect the ultimate export destination and the type of export
commodity, technical information or service involved.
B. The Russian Pipeline Export Regulationss
The President responded to the December 26, 1981, declaration of
martial law in Poland by prohibiting exports of oil and gas technology
from the United States to the Soviet Union.9 The Commerce Department
accordingly promulgated regulations pursuant to the authority of section
6 of the EAA '79.10 The December export regulations prevented U.S. com-
panies from performing contracts relating to the supply of oil and gas
technology for the construction and operation of the Soviet natural gas
pipeline between Siberia and Western Europe.
Reaction to the December export regulations was unfavorable among
oil and gas business concerns in the United States. The U.S. companies
complained about the loss of sales to Western European and Japanese
companies,1 1 which obtained the Soviet business precluded by the Decem-
ber export regulations.1 2
The heads of state of Western Europe, Japan and the United States
met in Versailles during June of 1982,13 to discuss East-West trade rela-
tionships and to attempt formulation of a policy governing trade between
merce Department in the area of export controls.
s 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (1982) (repealed 1982) and 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982) (repealed
1982).
9 17 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 1429 (Dec. 29, 1981); N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1981, at 1,
col 3.
10 The Department of Commerce issued the December regulations, supra note 3, on
December 30, 1981, and the issued regulations appeared in 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (1982) (re-
pealed 1982).
11 Letter from Richard L. Lesher, President, Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America, to the Honorable William E. Brock, U.S. Trade Representative (March 1,
1982) (questioning the appropriateness of unilateral export controls imposed for foreign pol-
icy purposes that result merely in a loss of sales by U.S. companies to foreign competitors).
'2 The concerns of U.S. companies sparked hearings in Congress. Avenues were ex-
plored for preventing the business lost by the American companies from being performed by
companies outside of the United States for the Soviets. The Senate Foreign Relations Sub-
committee on International Economic Policy held hearings on the standing in foreign coun-
tries and in international law of U.S. imposed export controls directed against foreign com-
panies utilizing U.S. technology through license or other arrangements to provide equipment
or technical assistance for the construction and operation of the Soviet natural gas pipeline.
Washington Post, Mar. 8, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
13 The conference was held on June 4-6, 1982. See Washington Post, June 6, 1982, at
Al, col. 1.
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Western nations and the Eastern bloc countries." One of the primary is-
sues discussed was the credit terms to be extended to Eastern bloc na-
tions for financing purchases from the West. At the Versailles meetings,
the United States achieved the understanding that the Western European
nations would cease extending below-market rate credit terms to the So-
viets to finance construction and operation of the Urengoy natural gas
pipeline.15 However, statements made by various Western European lead-
ers at the conclusion of the conference convinced the U.S. leaders that
the understanding regarding credit terms for the Soviets would be ig-
nored by the Western European nations."6
On June 18, 1982, the President ordered promulgation of export reg-
ulations prohibiting reexport of goods produced abroad in accordance
with technical information furnished pursuant to agreements transferring
U.S.-origin technology to companies abroad. 7 The June reexport regula-
tions' s8 were retroactive. They affected technology licensing agreements
between U.S. and foreign companies executed prior to the June date
when the regulations were first announced. Moreover, the June reexport
regulations asserted U.S. jurisdiction over companies having no greater
connection with the United States than a technology transfer license with
a U.S. corporation. 9 Thus, the June regulations prohibited transfers of
goods, which were manufactured by a foreign company in accordance
with U.S.-origin technical information, to the Soviet Union from a nation
outside the United States. 20
14 See Washington Post, June 4, 1982, at Al, col. 4.
15 Washington Post, June 19, 1982, at A10, col. 1.
16 N.Y. Times, June 23, 1982, at D3, col. 1. In support of the view that the regulations
were a less than subtle prod aimed at the European allies by the executive branch of the
United States government, see Schutte, Jr., Pipeline Politics, 4 S.A.I.S. REv. 137 (1982).
17 President's Statement on Extension of U.S. Sanctions, 18 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc.
820 (June 18, 1982). The controls also were imposed on non-U.S.-origin goods, services and
technical data destined for reexport to the Soviet Union by foreign businesses owned or
controlled by U.S. interests.
18 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982) (repealed 1982).
10 Id. at 27,251, amending 15 C.F.R. § 379.8(a) (1982) to add subparagraph (a)(4)(ii).
This provision is the primary focus of the present article.
20 Shipments of such goods to the Soviet Union prompted the Commerce Department
to issue Temporary Denial Orders (denial of export privileges pending investigation of sus-
pected violation of export regulations, hereinafter referred to as a TDO) against John Brown
Engineering Ltd. (JBE) on September 9, 1982, published at 47 Fed. Reg. 40,205 (1982),
Creusot-Loire, S.A. (C-L) on August 26, 1982, published at 47 Fed. Reg. 38,169 (1982),
Nuovo Pigone, Ltd. (N-P), published at 47 Fed. Reg. 39,709 (1982), AEG-Kanis GmbH
(AEG-K) and Mannesmann Anlagenbau AG on October 5, 1982, published at 47 Fed. Reg.
44,604 (1982). JBE's only connection with the U.S. was a technology transfer agreement
with the General Electric Company (GE). C-L, a corporation organized under the laws of
France, had a license agreement with Cooper Industries, Inc. of Dallas, Texas. N-P, a corpo-
ration wholly-owned by the Italian government, had a license agreement with GE. AEG-K, a
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Foreign governments and companies resented the June reexport reg-
ulations, because the regulations asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction and
had a retroactive effect. The regulations eliminated the benefits of foreign
licensees under technology transfer licenses, and they precluded perform-
ance of supply contracts dependent upon performance of such licenses.
Most, if not all, of the affected licenses were executed long before the
announcement and promulgation of the regulations. Thus, the June reex-
port regulations were tantamount to the imposition of a retroactive pen-
alty upon already executed technology transfer licenses and their related
sales contracts.2 1 The regulations also purported to regulate reexport of
goods from nations outside of the United States to the Soviet Union by
non-U.S. affiliated companies. In so doing, the regulations attempted to
extend the jurisdiction of U.S. law to govern exports from foreign nations
made by non-U.S. origin businesses. This assertion of extraterritorial ju-
risdictional was resented bitterly in Western Europe.2 2
II. LEGALITY OF FOREIGN-POLICY MOTIVATED RETROACTIVE REEXPORT
REGULATIONS
The June reexport regulations, by proscribing conduct committed
within the borders of foreign countries by foreign licensees of U.S. corpo-
rations, purport to extend the legal authority of the United States into
foreign countries. Since the regulations were promulgated under the au-
thority of the EAA '79, the legality of these export regulations depends
upon whether the EAA '79 provides for such extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Addressing this question requires determining the intent of Congress in
enacting the jurisdictional provisions of the EAA '79.
The specific provision of the June regulations under consideration in
this article predicates the jurisdiction of U.S. law on the existence of an
agreement between a U.S.-origin enterprise and a foreign business entity
to transfer U.S.-origin technical data. If Congress intended to authorize
extraterritorial jurisdiction on this basis, then a second inquiry is posed:
the direct extraterritorial effect of the June reexport regulations raises
the issues of the legality of these regulations under the laws of foreign
nations and the principles of international law.23
German corporation neither owned nor controlled by U.S. business interests, also had a
license agreement with GE.
"1 The Japanese objected to the retroactive effect of the June reexport regulation on a
contract executed in 1974, regarding the Japanese-Soviet petroleum drilling project off the
coast of Sakhalin Island. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1982, at D16, col 1.
22 Foreign ministers of Common Market countries condemned United States sanctions
on foreign licensees as violations of accepted trade rules and international law. N.Y. Times,
June 21, 1982, at D3, col. 1.
23 A Dutch court already has adjudged the extraterritorial jurisdictional provision in-
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The June regulations proscribe reexports of goods manufactured
abroad using U.S.-origin technical data. This aspect of the June regula-
tions retroactively impairs the performance of contracts concluded in con-
templation of the use of U.S.-origin technical data, which was lawfully
available when the contract originally was executed. The retroactive char-
acter of the June regulations raises the question whether the EAA '79
authorized retroactively effective reexport controls. The answer to this
question also requires ascertaining the intent of Congress.
A. The June Reexport Regulations
The June reexport regulations24 increased the number of transactions
requiring validated export licenses. This increase resulted from an expan-
sion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a wider range of traded items and
trading parties. The amended export controls covered foreign-produced
oil and gas related goods and services, if the goods or services utilize U.S.-
origin technical data, and if the use of the data was contingent upon roy-
alties or other compensation paid to any "person subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States." The June regulations were applicable without
regard to the date on which the data originally was exported from the
United States.2 5 Thus, a foreign licensee of U.S.-origin technical data be-
came subject to United States jurisdiction under the new regulations.
This result was achieved by adding subparagraph (a)(4)(ii) to the regula-
tions codified under 15 C.F.R. § 379.8, to extend controls over the
following:
any foreign produced direct products of U.S. technical data, or any com-
modity produced by any plant or major component thereof that is a di-
rect product of U.S. technical data, described in § 379.4 (f)(1)(i)(p) if:
serted into 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c)(2)(iv) by the June regulations, supra note 3, to be ineffective
under the law of the Netherlands to provide a basis for a force majeur defense entitling the
defendant to an exemption ex article 74 of the "Law in 'Respect of the International Sale of
Goods." The decision was made in a breach of contract action brought by a corporation of
French origin against a Netherlands corporate subsidiary of a U.S. corporation. Compagnie
Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 82-716, slip op. (District Court
at the Hague, filed Sept. 17, 1982). See generally Comments of the European Community
on the Amendments of 22 June 1982 to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations, filed
Aug. 12, 1982, with the International Trade Administration, U.S. Dept. Commerce.
" The extension of export controls to cover foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations
and foreign licensees of U.S. technology was announced by the President on June 18, 1982.
President's statement on Extension of U.S. Sanctions, 18 WE.KLY Comp. PRES. Doc. 820
(June 18, 1982). The Commerce Department issued the regulations, which were published at
47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982), on June 22, 1982.
Specifically, the export controls codified at 15 C.F.R. § 279.8 were expanded by




... (ii) The U.S. technical data are the subject of a licensing agreement
with, or the use of the data is contingent upon royalty payments or
other compensation to, any person subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States as defined in § 385.2(c), regardless of when the data were
exported from the U.S.;... 2
The June regulations provided the definition of "person subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States" for the purpose of applying section
385.2(c) that included:
(i) Any person, wherever located, who is a citizen or resident of the
United States;
(ii) Any person actually within the United States;
(iii) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of
any state, territory, possession, or district of the United States; or
(iv) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization,
wherever organized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by per-
sons specified in paragraphs (i), (ii), or (iii) of this section. 7
In addition, the June regulations create two additional but separate
bases for jurisdiction involving the specific provisions of the agreement
transferring the technical information. If under the terms of the technol-
ogy transfer agreement, (1) "the recipient of the technical data has agreed
to abide by U.S. export control regulations,' 28 or (2) the original export of
the data from the U.S. was conditioned on the furnishing of a written
assurance against reexport of the data, or the product of the data, to the
Soviet Union,2' then in accordance with U.S. export law, the goods may
not be reexported without obtaining a validated license from the Com-
merce Department.3 0
Thus, for purposes of imposing export controls, one of the predicates
for jurisdiction provided by the June regulations is the mere existence of
a contract for technology transfer between a foreign national and a com-
pany owned or controlled by U.S. interests. The legality of this jurisdic-
tional predicate is investigated in this paper.
47 Fed. Reg. 27,251 (1982) (repealed 1982) (emphasis added).
Id. at 27,252 (1982).
Id. at 27,251 (1982).
"Id.
20 Contracts between private parties cannot alter or determine international law. Only
treaties between states may confer on one state party to the treaty, jurisdiction within the
other state party to the treaty, if that jurisdiction otherwise would be contrary to interna-
tional law. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF THE FOREIGN REL. LAw OF THE UNrrED STATEs [herein-
after cited as the RESTATEmEN 2D] § 25; see Akehbrst, Jurisdiction in International Law,
[1972-73] Bhr. Y.B. INr'L L. 145, 147; see also The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11
U.S. 116, 135 (1812) ("The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory,. is suscep-
tible of no limitation, not imposed by itself .... ").
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B. Legality Under United States Law
Challenges to the legality of the June reexport regulations under
United States law may be based on substantive or procedural grounds.31
The substantive grounds arise in consideration of the President's author-
ity under the EAA '79 to promulgate retroactively effective reexport con-
trols, which require an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction by the
United States. The procedural grounds include the promulgation of the
regulations in accordance with the statutory scheme provided by Con-
gress in the EAA '79.
1. The Congressionally Authorized Extraterritorial Jurisdictional
Reach of the EAA '79
Did Congress in enacting section 6 of the EAA '79 intend to author-
ize the President to impose export controls that asserted U.S. jurisdiction
over foreign companies for actions taken on foreign soil? More specifi-
cally, did Congress intend that jurisdiction be based on the grounds that
the foreign companies were licensees of U.S. companies and that the ac-
tions involved the exportation of products evolved from licensed technol-
ogy of U.S origin?
Executive action constituting an incursion upon the powers of Con-
gress will be found void,32 but the failure of Congress to delegate a partic-
31 Attempts to challenge the legality of the June reexport regulations were made in
several forums. Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldrige, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 23, 1982);
In re Dresser (France) S.A., No. 632 (U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade
Administration, filed Aug. 26, 1982); Creusot-Loire S.A. v. Baldrige, No. 82-2787 (D.D.C.
filed Sept. 29, 1982); In re Creusot-Loire S.A., No. 633 (U.S. Department of Commerce In-
ternational Trade Administration, filed Sept. 9, 1982); In re John Brown Engineering Ltd.,
No. 635 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce International Trade Administration, filed Oct. 1, 1982). In
the Creusot-Loire Commerce Department proceeding, the hearing commissioner issued aA
order on September 10, 1982, requiring Creusot-Loire and the Department of Commerce to
brief the question of the jurisdiction of a Commerce Department hearing commissioner to
determine the authority of the President under the EAA '79. See Complaint for Declara-
tory and Injunctive Relief at 13, Creusot-Loire S.A. v. Baldrige, No. 82-2787 (D.D.C. filed
Sept. 29, 1982). The hearing commissioner ruled orally at the hearing that he only had juris-
diction to apply the regulations to the facts before him, and that jurisdiction to consider the
legality of the regulations rested with the Office of Assistant Deputy Secretary for Interna-
tional Trade on appeal from the initial decision of the hearing commissioner. This ruling
was repeated by the hearing examiner in his initial decision, In re Creusot-Loire S.A., No.
633, slip op. at 7 (U.S. Dept. Comm., Oct. 29, 1982).
The June regulations were withdrawn before a decision on the merits was rendered in
any of the judicial forums regarding the authority of the President under the EAA '79 to
impose foreign policy motivated retroactive reexport regulations. President's Announcement
of Lifting of Soviet Natural Gas Pipeline Export Sanctions, 18 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc.
13,265 (Nov. 13, 1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 51,858 (1982).
n United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affrd on other
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ular authority to the President in the area of foreign policy and national
security does not imply disapproval of presidential action consistent with
the nondelegated authority."3 However, in promulgating the June regula-
tions, the President purported to act pursuant to the authority of the
EAA '79,-" and not pursuant to any other authority legally vested in the
President by either Congress or the Constitution.
The specific question of presidential authority that is considered here
is whether foreign-policy motivated, retroactively effective regulations, as-
serting extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign licensees of U.S. technol-
ogy based upon the existence of a technology transfer license between the
foreign licensee and a U.S. company, can be imposed validly pursuant to
the EAA '79.36 This requires investigation of the jurisdictional provisions
of the EAA '79, and specifically, the intent of Congress regarding these
jurisdictional provisions.
a. Jurisdictional provisions of the EAA '79
The authority of the President to promulgate foreign-policy con-
trols37 under the EAA '79 is limited to exports of goods, technology or
other information "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" or
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955) (executive agreement with Canada attempting to avoid compli-
ance with congressional action in the area of foreign trade) and Yoshida International, Inc.
v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155 (Cust. Ct. 1974) (executive order issued contrary to
congressionally enacted scheme of foreign trade law).
3 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,
291 (1981)).
34 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982). The question of the President's authority under the EAA
'79 is separate from the question of the legality of the regulations as complying with the
criteria set forth in the act itself. The criteria are set forth in EAA '79, supra note 1, at §
6(b) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (Supp. IV 1980)).
" However, after the fact, the Department of Justice defended the legality of the June
regulations by adverting to the constitutionally authorized power of the President to con-
duct foreign policy. These powers and their constitutional sources were identified as: The
Executive Power, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cI. 1; the Power to make Treaties and Appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; the power to
receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers, U.S. CONST. art. H, § 3; and the duty to see
that the Laws be faithfully executed, U.S. CONST. art. H, § 3. Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 49, Dresser
Industries, Inc. v. Baldrige, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 23, 1982).
36 The Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives concluded, "that
export controls on oil and gas transmission, refining, and related equipment, and technical
data, and the assertion of those controls extraterritorially to subsidiaries and foreign licen-
sees of U.S. firms, fulfill virtually none of these [EAA '79, supra note 1, at § 6(b), codified at
50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (Supp. IV 1980)] criteria." H.R. REP. No. 762, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1982).
" The June reexport regulations were promulgated under the foreign-policy export
control section of the EAA '79, supra note 1, at § 6; 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (Supp. IV 1980).
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exports by any person "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."38
Thus, promulgation of rules under the authority conferred by the EAA
'79 extends to things exported and persons exporting, both of which are
"subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
Since the EAA '79 explicitly authorizes export controls regarding
things or persons "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," ' in-
vestigation into the congressional intention to authorize promulgation of
retroactive reexport regulations under the EAA '79 begins with the defini-
tion of jurisdiction provided by the Act itself. Unfortunately, the Act fails
to provide any explicit definition of jurisdiction. 0 Nor does the EAA '79
provide a definition which describes what constitutes either a person or
thing "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
The EAA '79 defines "person" to include corporations,41 but no men-
tion is made of foreign corporations. The Act expands the definition of
person by defining, "United States person" to include "any foreign sub-
sidiary or affiliate ... of any domestic concern. ' '42 However, the defini-
tion of "United States person" provided by the EAA '7943 is too narrow to
include the foreign licensee of technology of a U.S. corporation or to en-
compass a foreign company not owned or controlled by U.S. interests.
This also may be seen by inference from the term's use elsewhere in
the Act. For example, the antiboycott provisions of the EAA '79,44 en-
acted in response to the Arab boycott of Israel, apply to a "United States
person. '45 However, the extraterritorial scope of the antiboycott provi-
sions is expressly limited to "activities in the interstate or foreign com-
merce of the United States."' "4 This would exclude from the Act's jurisdic-
tion trade between two foreign nations that does not involve U.S.
interests.
The phrase "United States person" does not appear in the foreign-
policy export controls section of the EAA '79.17 Instead, the foreign-policy
controls section uses the phrase "person subject to the jurisdiction of the
" EAA '79, supra note 3, at § 6(a)(1) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(1) (Supp. IV
1980)).
11 EAA '79, supra note 3, at § 6(a) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a) (Supp. IV
1980)).
40 The only definitional sections of the EAA '79, are codified, as amended, at 50 U.S.C.
app. 88 2403-1(d), 2415 (Supp. IV 1980).
41 EAA '79, supra note 1, at § 16(1) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415(1) (Supp. IV
1980)).
4 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
43 Id.
44 EAA '79, supra note 1, at 8 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (Supp. IV 1980)).
41 Codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 8 2407(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
46 Id.
"I EAA '79, supra note 1, at 8 6 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (Supp. IV 1980)).
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United States. '48 Nevertheless, no jurisdictional distinction between regu-
lations issued in furtherance of national-security goals,' 9 versus regula-
tions motivated by foreign-policy aims,50 is apparent from the language of
the EAA '79.
The historical precedent for the congressional enactment of the EAA
'79 provides a useful perspective for the determination of congressional
intent. This history includes prior statutes and regulations. Three factors
are important for a review of the legislation and regulatory actions pre-
ceding the EAA '79. These factors are the regulations' extraterritorial
character regarding the assertion of jurisdiction over non-U.S. owned or
controlled licensees of U.S.-origin technology, the regulations' retroactive
applicability and the distinction between national-security controls and
foreign-policy controls.
51
b. Legislative precedent for jurisdictional provisions of the EAA '79
The phrase "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," brings
with it a congressional history both inside and outside the field of export
controls. 2 This history begins with the United Nations Participation Act
of 1945, which permits the President to implement measures recom-
mended by the U.N. Security Council through regulation of "economic
relations. . . between any foreign country or any. . . person therein and
the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or
involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."53
The Trading With The Enemy Act" applies to "any person, or... prop-
erty, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."' 5 Further, the In-
ternational Emergency Economic Powers Act 5 provides the President
with the authority to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat
48 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
4EAA '79, supra note 1, at § 5 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (Supp. IV 1980)).
50 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (Supp. IV 1980).
51 See Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law:
The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439, 479 (1981), for the
view that a greater presumption of validity under international law attaches to national-
security motivated controls than to foreign-policy motivated controls.
82 United Nations Participation Act of Dec. 20, 1945, c. 583, § 5, 59 Stat. 620, 22 U.S.C.
§ 287c; International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. 95-223, Title U, § 203(a)(1),
91 Stat. 1626, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980); Trading With the Enemy Act, §
5(b)(1), 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1); Export Administration Act of 1979, §§ 5(a)(1), 6(a)(1), 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2404(a)(1), 2405(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980); Bretton Woods Agreement Amend-
ments Act, Pub. L. No. 95-435, § 5(d), 92 Stat. 1051, 1052 (1978) (repealed 1979).
53 22 U.S.C. § 287c(a) (Supp. V 1981).
"50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-40 (Supp. IV 1980) (hereinafter cited as the TWEA).
"' 50 U.s.c. app. § 5(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. IV 1980).
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from outside the United States to the national security, foreign policy or
national economy. For the purposes of this Act, the President is invested
with authox :ty over persons and property, "subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States. 57 In 1977, the Export Administration Act of 19695s
was amended to include the jurisdictional language under discussion. 9
c. Export controls issued under prior export laws60
A statute reenacted after years of an established and consistent ad-
ministrative practice, must be read as being consistent with that estab-
lished administrative practice.61
The Foreign Assets Control Regulations s2 the Transaction Control
Regulations 8 and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations" were promul-
gated under the TWEA. They apply to persons or property "subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States."65 The Foreign Assets Control Reg-
ulations and the Transaction Control Regulations are administered by the
Treasury Department for the protection of national-security interests.
The Cuban Assets Control Regulations originally were adopted as na-
tional-security controls under the TWEA in 1963, in response to the Cu-
ban Missile Crisis. Nonetheless, the Cuban regulations provided an ex-
ception to permit foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms to trade with Cuba, if
neither U.S.-origin goods nor U.S. citizens or residents were involved."
Each set of regulations defines "persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States" to include persons physically present in the United States,
corporations organized under U.S. law, or foreign businesses owned or
controlled by either U.S. citizens or residents.67 In addition, the Foreign
57 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
5 EAA '69, supra note 1.
59 Title III of the Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 amended the
Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 to add the jurisdic-
tional language in question.
60 Congress considered prior export regulations during its deliberations over the EAA
'79. E.g., S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong. 1st Seas. 18 (1979) (Senate Report on Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1979) (deliberation over the scope of technology to be subjected to export
controls).
61 CBS v. FCC, 453 ,U.S. 367 (1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 433,
450, 457 (1978); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976); Blackfeet Tribe v.
Montana, 507 F. Supp. 446, 451 (D. Mont. 1981).
62 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1981). These regulations prohibit trade with certain Communist
countries.
031 C.F.R. pt. 505 (1981). These regulations embargo transactions in strategic prod-
ucts bound for actual or potential strategic adversary countries.
4 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1981). These regulations embargo trade with Cuba.
- 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201(a), 505.20, 515.201 (1981).
31 C.F.R. § 515.541 (1963) (modified 1975).
-7 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.329, 505.20, 515.329 (1981).
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Assets Control Regulations, the Transaction Control Regulations and the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations include in their definition of "property
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," securities issued by U.S.
persons and governmental agencies or securities evidenced by certificates
located within the United States." However, prior to the 1977 amend-
ment of the EAA '69, it is doubtful whether exports by foreign subsidiar-
ies of U.S. corporations were within the TWEA's jurisdiction. 9 Thus, the
TWEA regulations apply only to persons or things bearing some territo-
rial nexus to the United States at the time of the assertion of jurisdiction.
The retroactive assertion of jurisdiction forbidding reexport of prod-
ucts produced under licenses for U.S. technology and transferred prior to
either notice or imposition of the export controls is an unprecedented oc-
currence. Export controls were issued in 1978, prohibiting exports of oil
and gas technology to the Soviet Union without a validated export li-
cense.70 These controls were promulgated in furtherance of foreign-policy
objectives related to Soviet actions against two dissidents. The controls
asserted U.S. authority over goods produced by foreign licensees of U.S.
technology. However, by their terms, the controls were not retroactively
applicable. They only applied to reexports of the product of technical
data, which had not yet been exported at the time the controls were im-
posed. Moreover, the 1978 controls only required the exporter, as a pre-
requisite to an entitlement to export under a general export license for
technical data under restriction (GTDR), to obtain from the importer
written assurance that neither the technical data nor the direct product
of the technical data was intended to be shipped, directly or indirectly, to
the Soviet Union.
The Rhodesian embargo by the United Nations resulted in foreign-
policy motivated regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department
under the authority of the United Nations Participation Act.71 Foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. firms, other than subsidiaries in Rhodesia itself, were
not included within the regulations' definition of "person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. '7 2
- 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.313, 505.20, 515.313 (1981).
69 See S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4540, 4545. See also Malloy, Embargo Programs of the United States Treasury
Department, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 485, 511 (1981) (since Export Control Regulations
only reached exports from the U.S., the Transaction Control Regulations, issued under §
5(b) of the TWEA, provided no authority over exports from foreign countries by U.S.-owned
foreign subsidiaries).
70 The 1978 regulations were published at 43 Fed. Reg. 33,699 (1978).
71 22 U.S.C. § 287c (Supp. V 1981).
72 31 C.F.R. § 530.404 (1979), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,183, 44 Fed. Reg. 74,841
(1979).
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The Iranian Assets control Regulations73 were issued pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act 7 4 to implement the trade
embargo on Iran in response to the seizure of U.S. hostages. This act au-
thorized the imposition of export controls upon any person "subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States. 75 These regulations applied to for-
eign property in the possession of a person subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States.76 Nonbanking foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations
were expressly excluded from the Iran trade embargo by the President's
Executive Order.77 The implementing regulations contain the same limi-
tation on the jurisdictional reach of the Iranian Financial Transaction
Controls.78 However, the Iranian trade embargo also asserted jurisdiction
over Iranian government property in the hands of persons "subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States," which was defined within the regula-
tions to include foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms.7 s
The export controls implementing the Uganda embargo protesting
human rights violations, asserted jurisdiction over exports of non-U.S.-
origin goods by foreign companies controlled by U.S. interests."' These
regulations were proposed (but never became final) to prohibit exports of
goods to Uganda by "any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States" until Presidential certification to Congress that the Ugandan
Government violations of human rights had ceased.8"
d. Prior export controls issued under the EAA '79
Export controls issued pursuant to § 6 of the EAA '79 were applied
to Libya82 and to the military and police authorities of South Africa and
Namibia.83 None of those export controls reached technical data after the
data originally was exported from the United States. Regulations imple-
menting a partial embargo on trade with military and police authorities
7 31 C.F.Rt.p7 535 (1981).
- 50 U.S.C. § 1701(1706 (Supp. IV 1980).
75 50 U.S.C. 91702(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
78 31 C.F.R. 99 535.201, 535.329 (1981).
77 Exec. Order No. 12,205, § 1-102, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980), revoked by Exec. Order
No. 12,282, § 101, 46 Fed. Reg. 7,925 (1981).
78 31 C.F.R. § 535.207(b) (1980) (repealed 1981).
7. 15 C.F.R. § 535.329, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,957 (1979).
10 43 Fed. Reg. 58,571 (1978).
81 The statutory authority for the Ugandan regulations was the Bretton Woods Agree-
ment Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 95-435, § 5(d), 92 Stat. 1051, 1052 (1978) (repealed
1979), which amended the EAA '69, specifically, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(m), repealed by Pub.
L. No. 96-67, 93 Stat. 415 (1979).
82 47 Fed. Reg. 11,247 (1982) (repealed 1982).
43 Fed. Reg. 7,311 (1978).
43 Fed. Reg. 7,311 (1978) and 47 Fed. Reg. 11,247 (1982).
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in South Africa and Namibia were not asserted over transactions involv-
ing foreign-origin products exported from countries other than South Af-
rica and Namibia by subsidiaries controlled by U.S.-origin interests. 5
Moreover, both sets of regulations avoided interfering with 'existing
contractual arrangements. The regulations applicable to South African
and Namibian military and police authorities permitted a two month
grace period for service contracts in effect at the time the regulations
were promulgated.8" The Libyan regulations excepted from the export
controls: (1) transactions involving preexisting contractual commitments
under which performance would not be excused for failure to obtain an
export license, (2) validated export licenses issued prior to the effective
date of the regulations, and (3) export of nonstrategic foreign-produced
direct product of U.S.-origin technical data.87
The 1980 Olympic Boycott Regulations" extended to any "person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." The key phrase was de-
fined to exclude foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.89
The 1980 embargo on Russian grain sales also was inapplicable to
transactions conducted by foreign companies in non-U.S.-origin grain. 0
Moreover, the Russian grain embargo was prospective in its application to
wheat and corn 1 and permitted fulfillment of shipments of other agricul-
tural commodities already in transit on the date of the President's direc-
tive.9 2 The Russian grain embargo regulations were motivated by na-
tional-security concerns in addition to foreign-policy concerns,93 and thus
were made applicable to reexports of U.S.-origin agricultural commodities
from other countries to the Soviet Union."
The December export regulations 5 also were not retroactively ap-
plied. Only products produced in accordance with technical data trans-
mitted on or after December 30, 1981, were subjected to the regulations.
Nor did they apply to reexports of goods produced in accordance with
U.S. licensed technology. They were not asserted extraterritorially. Both
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies and foreign companies controlled
by U.S. interests were unaffected by the December export regulations.
" 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a) (1982).
" 43 Fed. Reg. 7,311-12 (1978).
47 Fed. Reg. 11,247 (1982) (repealed 1982).
" 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(d) (1982).
89 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(d)(3) (1982).
15 C.F.R. § 376.5, 45 Fed. Reg. 1,883 (1980) (repealed 1981).
91 15 C.F.R. § 376.5(b), 45 Fed. Reg. 1,884 (1980) (repealed 1981).
15 C.F.R. § 376.5(c), 45 Fed. Reg. 1,884 (1980) (repealed 1981).
"3 45 Fed. Reg. 1,883 (1980) (repealed 1981).
" 15 C.F.I. § 376.5(a), 45 Fed. Reg. 1,884 (1980) (repealed 1981).
95 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (1982) (repealed 1982).
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e. Case law interpretations of the extraterritorial jurisdictional provi-
sions of the EAA '79
There is no U.S. case law specifically treating the merits of the extra-
territorial jurisdictional issues created by the June regulations.9 6
The phrase "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" was in-
terpreted in a judicial opinion 7 issued shortly before the Congress began
its deliberations over the EAA '79.98 The phrase occurred outside the area
of exports controls, in the Marine Mammal Protectional Act.99 The court
held that a U.S. citizen hunting in the waters of a foreign nation under a
license from the foreign nation was not within the ambit of the jurisdic-
tional reach of the Act.100
The reaction of courts in the United States to attempted assertions
by foreign governments of extraterritorial jurisdiction over events, per-
sons and things in the United States sheds some light on the legality of
the June regulations under American law. In this regard, orders of for-
eign governments for the seizure of assets in the United States are not
accepted as valid.101 Nor may the use of technology in the U.S. be gov-
erned by foreign patent laws. 10 2 Thus, there is evidence that U.S. courts
tend to resist assertions by foreign governments of extraterritorial juris-
diction into the United States.
" The Commerce Department has issued a decision upholding the extraterritorial juris-
dictional reach of the June regulations as authorized by the EAA '79. In re Dresser (France)
S.A., No. 632, slip op. (Ass't Sec'y of Commerce for Trade Administration, filed Nov. 1,
1982).
' United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
,8 The phrase also was interpreted by the Hong Kong Supreme Court, sitting as a trial
court, so as to preclude U.S. jurisdiction over goods unloaded from a U.S. transport ship and
placed onto Hong Kong soil. This interpretation was noted when the Supreme Court of
Hong Kong sat in American President Lines, Ltd. v. China Mutual Trading Co., 1953
A.M.C. 1510, 1518 (Hong Kong Sup. Ct. 1953) as a reviewing court. In the appellate deci-
sion, the Hong Kong Supreme Court reviewed the definitions of "Property subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" contained in the Foreign Assets Control Regulations,
which were issued pursuant to the TWEA in the 50's, and concluded that the phrase was
inapplicable to goods situated in a foreign country and owned by a foreign national, even if
the goods were under the control of a U.S. citizen. Id. at 1527.
09 Codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1361 et seq. The phrase itself occurred in the law at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1372(a)(1) and (3) and in the codified regulations at 50 C.F.R. §§ 216.11(c) and 216.13(b)
(1974).
100 United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir. 1977).
101 United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976); Republic of Iraq
v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
'02 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) ("[O]ur patent
system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect . . . and we correspondingly reject the
claims of others to such control over our market."); Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 703
(1890); Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Products, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931 (D.N.J.
1983); Griffin v. Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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f. Subsequent congressional action
Actions taken by Congress in response to the imposition of the June
reexport regulation are relevant in any judicial determination of the origi-
nal intent of Congress.103
The sponsors 0 ' of a bill 5 to rescind the December 30, 1981, and
June 22, 1982, Export Trade Administration Regulations did not question
or deny the authority granted to the President by the EAA '79 to impose
extraterritorial export controls. 106 However, the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs determined that the December and June regulations
failed to satisfy the criteria 07 set forth by the EAA '79 for presidential
consideration prior to imposition of such controls.10 8 The Committee con-
cluded that the extraterritorial assertion of such controls against subsidi-
aries and foreign licensees of U.S. firms failed to fulfill any of the relevant
criteria prescribed by the EAA '79 for consideration by the President. °10
Moreover, though not challenging whether such extraterritorial controls
as the June regulations exceed the President's authority under the EAA
'79, the Committee did determine that such authority was not explicit in
the EAA '79.110 The amended version of the bill narrowly passed by the
House, called for repeal of the December and June regulations in 90 days,
if at that time the President certified to Congress that the Soviets were
not using forced labor to build their natural gas pipeline.
2. Compliance of the June Regulations with Statutory Require-
ments of the EAA '79
The EAA '79 requires presidential consideration of several factors1
when the President imposes, expands or extends export controls under
the foreign-policy control authority of the statute. The President must
103 The doctrine of congressional acquiescence has been recognized by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915). See also Persinger v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 690 F.2d 1010 (D.C.Cir. 1982); Kaplan v. Corcoran, 545 F.2d 1073,
1077 (7th Cir. 1976).
104 The sponsors of the bill were members of the President's political party.
1o5 H.R. 6838, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982).
106 H.R. REP. No. 762, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982).
107 EAA '79, supra note 1, at § 6(b) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (Supp. IV
1980)).
10 H.R. REP. No. 762, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982).
109 Id.
21 H.R. REP. No. 762, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. 6 (1982).
" EAA '79, supra note 1, at § 6(b) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (Supp. IV
1980) (Criteria)); EAA '79, supra note 1, at § 6(d) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(d)
(Supp. IV 1980) (alternative means)); EEA '79, supra note 1, at § 6(e) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2405(e) (Supp. IV 1980) (notification to Congress)) and EAA '79, supra note 1, at §
6(g) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(g) (Supp. IV 1980) (foreign availability)).
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report to Congress regarding the conclusions of the President with respect
to each of the criteria set forth in section 6(b) of the EAA '79.112 The
President also is required to report to Congress regarding how the con-
trois in question significantly further the foreign policy of the United
States.113
Promulgation of the June reexport regulations was accompanied by
conclusory statements of presidential compliance 14 with the EAA '79
mandated consideration of the requisite criteria,1 5 alternative means 16
and foreign availability.117 However, the notice of rule promulgation pub-
lished in the Federal Register does not state that the requisite report was
submitted to Congress. The EAA '79 provides for confidential submission
of the report to Congress.1 8 Thus, the President may have submitted the
congressionally mandated conclusions in compliance with the EAA '79,
and Congress may have considered these conclusions in due course.119
112 The Presidential reporting requirement, EAA '79, supra note 1, at § 6(e) (codified at
50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(e) (Supp. IV 1980)).
123 Id.; The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives has ex-
pressed general dissatisfaction with past Executive adherence to the statutory scheme for
implementing foreign policy controls under the EAA '79, as follows:
The committee has assessed the imposition of controls for foreign policy pur-
poses since 1979 by two Presidents. Setting aside disagreements on whether or not
the authority to impose controls should have been used in particular ways and
foreign policy circumstances, the committee finds that the executive branch pro-
cess for deciding to employ controls has been deficient. The executive branch has
generally failed to consult with other countries before imposing controls, which
has reduced possibilities for bilateral or multilateral cooperation, and has in-
creased allied irritation. The Congress has generally not been consulted prior to
the imposition of control [sic], but merely has been notified after the controls were
imposed. The reports to the Congress required of the President have been re-
ceived so long after the imposition of controls that the committee concludes that
consideration of the criteria in the act for imposing controls occurs only after the
controls are imposed, and only in the context of justifying the controls to the
Congress.
H.R. REP. No. 257 Part 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1983).
114 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982) (repealed 1982).
115 EAA '79, supra note 1, at § 6(b) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (Supp. IV
1980)).
111 Id. at § 6(d) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(d) (Supp. IV 1980)).
117 Id. at § 6(g) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(g) (Supp. IV 1980)).
218 Id. at § 6(e) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(e) (Supp. IV 1980)).
11, The EAA '79 also requires the Secretary of Commerce prior to imposing foreign-
policy controls to consult with industry regarding: (1) the probability that the controls will
achieve the intended foreign policy purpose in light of the availability of non-U.S. sources of
supply, and (2) the domestic economic impact of the controls. EAA '79, supra note 1, at §
6(c) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(c) (Supp. IV 1980)). It is unclear when and in what
manner this consultation in regard to the June reexport regulations occurred. See, e.g., Let-
ter from Richard L. Lesher, President, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, to the President of the United States (Feb. 5, 1982) (filed with the Office of Export
Vol. 15:289
REEXPORT REGULATIONS
Moreover, the President is required only to consider the specific cri-
teria enumerated in section 6(b) of the EAA '79.121 The President neither
is required to conclude favorably with respect to any one criterion, nor a
majority of the criteria, before imposing export controls. It is sufficient
that the President has considered each criterion, notwithstanding any
negative effects that might result upon imposition of any particular set of
export controls. Thus, the criteria would appear to impose no prerequi-
sites to the validity of the June regulations.1 21
At least one committee of Congress, the House Committee on For-
eign Affairs, concluded that the June reexport regulations fulfilled virtu-
ally none of the section 6(b) criteria"" set for consideration by the Presi-
dent when promulgating export control regulations. 23 The House
Committee on Foreign Affairs took particular note of the fact that, "all
affected European governments have directed U.S. subsidiaries and licen-
sees within their jurisdiction to fulfill pipeline contracts in contravention
of the U.S. controls, so the controls can be enforced only with respect to
U.S. firms themselves."' " The Committee concluded that the controls
would have no significant effect upon Soviet decisions regarding events in
Poland. 25 Having concluded that the controls had failed to achieve their
foreign policy aims, the Committee saw no reason to prolong the controls
in force.1"
C. Legality of Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Provisions Under Foreign
Laws
The courts of foreign nations refuse to uphold the applicability of
United States law over acts committed in their territories by their
nationals.1 27
Administration, pursuant to the public comment period provided in 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250
(1982) (repealed 1982)) (urging consultation by the Administration with the business com-
munity prior to the imposition of extraterritorial controls).
120 Codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
" S. 397, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1983) would substantially change § 6(b) of the EAA
'79, supra note 1, (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (Supp. IV 1980)) to make satisfying
the criteria regarding foreign policy controls a mandatory prerequisite to the imposition of
such controls and puts the burden of proof on the Executive.
12 FAA '79, supra note 1, at § 6(b) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (Supp. IV
1980)).
123 H.R. REP. No. 726, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982).
124 Id.
115 Id.
, H.R. REP. No. 762, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982).
SE.g., Viscount Dilhorne in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 1
All E.R. 434, 460:
For many years now the United States has sought to exercise jurisdiction over
foreigners in respect of acts done outside the jurisdiction of that country. This is
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A Dutch court declined to recognize the validity of the June regula-
tions, which were offered as the basis for a force majeur defense in an
action to compel performance of a contract. 128 Sensor, a Dutch corpora-
tion wholly owned by a U.S. corporation, refused to perform its obliga-
tions under a contract with CEP, a French corporation, to supply equip-
ment bound for the Soviet Union's natural gas pipeline. Sensor argued
that it would be subject to severe penalties upon performance of its con-
tract with CEP, because Sensor, as a subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, was
subject to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the June reexport regula-
tions. Applying Netherlands law, the court looked to international law
principles in determining that the extraterritorial jurisdictional provi-
sion 129 of the June regulations regarding foreign subsidiaries of U.S. cor-
porations was invalid.
A U.S. vessel was transporting goods to Hong Kong in late 1950. The
ship docked in the Hong Kong harbor on the very day that the Foreign
Assets Control Regulations were promulgated pursuant to the authority
of the TWEA. After the goods had been unloaded from the ship and
placed in the custody of a Hong Kong warehouseman, the ship owner was
notified by the United States Government that the newly promulgated
regulations prohibited delivery of the goods to the Hong Kong purchaser.
The U.S. shipowner refused to execute the bills of lading, which would
permit the Hong Kong purchaser to retrieve the goods from the ware-
houseman. Sitting as a court of original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
of Hong Kong ruled that the goods in question were not "subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" within the meaning of that phrase in
the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, once the goods were unloaded
from the U.S. ship and deposited on Hong Kong soil. After conducting a
review of the use of the phrase by the Foreign Assets Control Regulations
in relation to securities, the Supreme Court of Hong Kong affirmed its
trial court decision.130
A British corporation was ordered by a U.S. court to relinquish pat-
ent rights in United Kingdom patents owned by the corporation. The
British corporation previously had contracted to assign the patent rights
in question to a third party. The third party sued in a British court to
compel the British corporation to assign the patent rights in accordance
not in accordance with international law and has led to legislation on the part of
other states, including the United Kingdom, designed to protect their nationals
from criminal proceedings in foreign courts where the claims to jurisdiction by
those courts are excessive and constitute an invasion of sovereignty.
128 Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 82-716, slip
op. (District Court at the Hague, filed Sept. 17, 1982).
129 Specifically, 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c)(2)(iv), as amended by 47 Fed. Reg. 27,252 (1982).
13 American President Lines, Ltd. v. China Mutual Trading Co., 1953 A.M.C. 1510
(Hong Kong Sup. Ct. 1953).
Vol. 15:289
REEXPORT REGULATIONS
with the contract, notwithstanding the U.S. court order. The British court
held that the British corporation must fulfill its contract with the third
party regarding assignment of the patent rights. The order of the U.S.
court was regarded as "an assertion of an extraterritorial jurisdiction
which we do not recognize for the American courts to make orders which
would destroy or qualify those statutory rights belonging to an English
national who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the American courts."'131
The British court noted that "American courts would likewise be slow (to
say the least) to recognize an assertion on the part of British courts of
jurisdiction extending, in effect, to the business affairs of persons and cor-
porations in the United States." 32
The legislative bodies of foreign nations have enacted protective laws
to shield their citizens from the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws. Some
of these foreign laws have included retaliatory measures, called "claw-
back" clauses.3 3
On March 20, 1980, the British Parliament enacted the Protection of
Trading Interests Act."' The primary, though unstated, purpose of the
Act was to resist incursions upon British jurisdiction and trading interests
by U.S. courts and other governmental authorities."35 The Act empowers
the British Secretary of State for Trade to forbid British citizens and
businesses to comply with orders of foreign authorities, if the orders have
extraterritorial effects within Britain to the prejudice of British trading
interests."8 The Secretary may invoke the powers of the Act after finding
that a proposed law of a foreign government would apply extraterritori-
ally to acts done by persons within the United Kingdom where such pro-
posed foreign law threatens to damage the trading interests of the United
Kingdom.1 7
The Secretary invoked the powers of the PTI Act against the June
regulations, thereby effectively rendering the June regulations invalid
under U.K. law."83
11 British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 2 All E.R. 780,
783 (Ct. App. 1952).
z Id. at 782.
"' E.g., Section 6 of the British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, in
force March 1980 (permitting recovery of antitrust damages awarded by foreign courts
against British antitrust defendants).
z" 1980, c. 11; in force Mar. 20, 1980 [hereinafter cited as the PTI].
111 See generally Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection
of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 Am. J. IN'L L. 257 (1981).
"' The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 1.
117 Id.; the PTI also forbids enforcement in the United Kingdom of foreign judgments
for multiple damages (PTI s. 5) and affords U.K. citizens the right to recover in U.K. courts
the non-compensatory portion of multiple damage awards paid under foreign judgments
(PTI a. 6).
"' The PTI (U.S. Reexport Control) Order, made June 30, 1982, in force July 1, 1982,
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Canada has enacted legislation amending the Combines Investigation
Act"s9 to protect Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. corporations from the ex-
traterritorial effects of U.S. laws, such as the TWEA.14° Section 31.5 of
the Act prohibits implementation in Canada of foreign judgments ad-
versely affecting Canadian internal commerce or export trade.141 Section
31.6 of the Act prohibits compliance of Canadian persons or companies
with foreign laws, or private directives giving extraterritorial effect to for-
eign laws, if such foreign laws or private directives would be likely to im-
pose adverse effects on the internal commerce or export trade of
Canada.1
4 2
Australia has enacted the Foreign Proceedings (prohibitions of cer-
tain evidence) Act of 1976.14' The Act is applicable when the Attorney
General is satisfied that "a foreign tribunal is exercising or proposing or
likely to exercise jurisdiction or powers of a kind or in a manner not con-
sistent with international law or comity. . . ."I'l The Act also applies
when the Attorney General is satisfied that restrictions must be imposed
for the purpose of protecting the national interest in relation to matters
over which the laws or executive powers of the Commonwealth of Austra-
lia assert jurisdiction.
The June regulations epitomize the resented extraterritorial jurisdic-
tional incursions proscribed by the preceding British, Canadian and Aus-
tralian laws.1 45
1982 No. 885.
119 CAN. REv. STAT. ch. C-23 (1970), amended by ch. 76 § 12, 1974-1975-1976 Can. Stat.
1535.
140 See R. ROBERTS, ANTICOMBINES ANDmANTITRUST CANADIAN LEGAL TEXT SmuES, 327,
329-30 (1980); M. FLAVELL, CANADIAN COMP TN LAw: A BusNEss GumE, 130 (1979).
141 CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-23 (1970), amended by ch. 76 § 12, 1974-1975-1976 Can. Stat.
1535.
142 Id.
141 Austl. Acts No. 121 (1976) (assented to November 19, 1976).
144 Id.
145 H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), would substantially reduce the authority of
the President to impose foreign policy controls by limiting the President's authority to ex-
portation from the United States. The changes that H.R. 3231 would make upon EAA '79,
supra note 1, at § 6(a)(1) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(a) (1)) are as follows, with exci-
sions square bracketed and additions italicized:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in paragraph (2)(b), (7), (8), or (13) of
section 3 of this Act, the President may prohibit or curtail the exportation from
the United States of any goods, technology, or other information [subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject to the jurisdic-
tion of] produced in the United States, to the extent necessary to further signifi-
cantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared international
objections.
H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 113(a) (1983). Exports from foreign countries by either
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations or licensees of U.S. corporations would not be subject to
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D. Legality of Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Provisions of the June
Regulations Under International Law Principles146
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is commonly founded on one or more of
five international law principles. 147 They have come to be known as the
territorial principle, the nationality principle, the protective principle, the
passive personality principle and the universality principle. Of these five,
the last two fail to bear any significant relevance to the subject matter at
hand, and thus are not discussed.1 48
The assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction may be contrary to inter-
national law, even if some generally accepted basis for jurisdiction exists,
if the extraterritorial jurisdiction also interferes with the jurisdictional
prerogatives of the governing authority of the foreign territory.1 49
the authority of the Executive acting alone. If the President wanted to impose reexport
controls, such as controls prohibiting the export from foreign countries of goods produced in
foreign countries using licensed technology of U.S. origin, the imposition of such controls
would require a joint resolution of Congress. H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 113(c)
(1983).
146 Absent an expressed purpose of Congress to legislate contrary to international law
principles, e.g., Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 319, 316-17 (1914); Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 193-95 (1888), the United States Supreme Court looks unfavorably upon stat-
utory interpretations at odds with the tenets of international law. Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacionale de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo S.A., 353 U.S. 138,
147 (1957); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-
Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Mitchell,
553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326 (2d Cir. 1972); RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 30, at § 38 and RESTATEMENT OF THE
FOREIGN REL. (REvI sED) § 403(4) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
mrNT TD2]. Thus, the validity under international law principles of the extraterritorial
reach of the June regulations becomes relevant to the validity of those regulations under
U.S. law, as well as international law.
1'7 Marcuss and Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law:
The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439 (1981).
"' The passive personality principle applies to acts done by aliens which have a direct
effect upon nationals of the state seeking to impose extraterritorial jurisdiction. The univer-
sality principle permits exercises of jurisdiction by any nation in regard to acts which are
deserving of punishment as a general matter of international public policy. The most often
cited example of the latter is piracy. Regarding the universality principle, see RESTATEMENT
OF THE FOREIGN REL. § 404 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT
TD3].
1" Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976);
Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1634 (1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). See
RESTATEMENT TD2, supra note 146, at § 403, comment a. ("Although one of the bases for
jurisdiction... is present, a state may not apply law to the conduct, relations, status, or
interests of persons or things having connections with another state or states when the exer-
cise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable." See also RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 30, at § 40.
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1. The Territorial Principle
The territorial principle5" holds that a nation may extend its juris-
diction over acts occurring within its own borders.15 This is the most fun-
damental basis for jurisdiction.1 52 Nations possess unlimited power to
prescribe conduct within their boundaries. 53
The territorial principle has been extended beyond national geo-
graphical boundaries by the so-called "effects doctrine." This doctrine
holds that a nation may extend its jurisdiction over actions occurring
outside its territory, if the actions affect events within its territorial bor-
ders.15 Acts producing effects within the territory of a nation are consid-
ered to occur within the territory of the nation. 155
The full significance of the effects doctrine is largely undefined. The
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
requires the effect to be "substantial" and a "direct and foreseeable result
of the conduct outside the territory." The effects doctrine is to be appli-
cable only in instances where "the rule is not inconsistent with the princi-
ples of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably devel-
oped legal systems."156 Such terms permit considerable latitude of
interpretation. However, the effects doctrine has been held in one forum
to provide an insufficient basis for the jurisdictional provisions found in
15 A general discussion of the territorial principle can be found in Sarkar, The Proper
Law of Crime in International Law, 11 INT'L. & Comp. L.Q. 446, 447-56 (1962).
"5 The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812); United States v. Mitchell,
553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977); RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 146, at § 17.
152 The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812); Interamerican Ref.
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del. 1970).
1 3 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 30, at § 17; RESTATEMENT TD2, supra note 146, at §
402(1)(a).
54RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 30, at §§ 10(a), 18(b) (1965); RESTATEMENT TD2, supra
note 146, at 402(1)(c), 403(b), 415; see e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (antitrust violation of foreign subsidiary of U.S. corporation);
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1961); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864
(10th Cir. 1981) (antitrust violation of foreign subsidiary of U.S. corporation), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 1634 (1982); United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1063 (1980) (extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons intending to distribute heroin
within U.S.); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884
(1967); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-45 (2d Cir. 1945)
(antitrust violation of foreign firm having no U.S. subsidiary corporate relationship). But
see Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975) (no U.S. jurisdiction over fraudulent acts committed abroad and only generally af-
fecting U.S. economy or the investing sector of the economy).
115 See Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations
Owned by Americans: Reflections on Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARv. L. REv. 579, 586
(1970).
1 RESTATEmENT 2D, supra note 30, at § 18(b), comments f, g and i.
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the June reexport regulations.157
Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Restatement raises an interesting issue
in its discussion of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment as a
limitation upon the extraterritorial thrust of federal law. The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is there interpreted to prohibit ex-
ercises of jurisdiction as to persons or property not within the territory of
the exercising body.1 5 8 Therefore, the extraterritorial jurisdictional reach
of the EAA '79 is arguably prohibited by the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.""s
2. The Nationality Principle
The nationality principle permits a nation to exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction over its nationals,16 0 even where the exercise of this jurisdic-
tion may confront the national in question with a choice between incur-
ring a penalty under the law of its home state or the law of the state of
residence.16 1 The most important aspect of the nationality principle for
purposes of the present discussion involves the determination of the ex-
tent to which a foreign licensee of a U.S. corporation may be considered a
national of the United States for purposes of the United States trade
laws. 16
2
The nationality of a corporation is elusive.163 According to a basic
principle, a corporation is invested with the nationality of its creating au-
thority." This principle is tempered by the view that primary jurisdic-
157 Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles SA. v. Nederland Sensor B.V., No. 82-716, slip
op. (District Court of the Hague, Sept. 17, 1982).
1" RESTATEMENT TD2, supra note 146, at § 403, reporter's note no. 9 (1981); See Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945); HENKIN, FoEEIGN AFFAiR S AND THE CONSTrruTION, 255-57 (1972).
189 Aliens are entitled to the due process protection of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Sardino v. Fed. Resv. Bd. of N.Y., 361 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1966).
0 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932); RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note
30, at §§ 10(b) and 30(1).
161 RESTATEMENT TD2, supra note 146, at § 406 (1981).
162 Some guidelines exist for the determination of the nation with which a juristic per-
son should be identified in relation to the anti-boycott statute section of the EAA '79.
Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The Need
for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRASNAT'L L. 439, 455-458 (1981).
163 See Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations
Owned by Americans: Reflections on Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARv. L. REv. 579, 589-92
(1970) (different nations determine corporate nationality according to different tests; some
nations apply several tests depending on the purpose of the determination; both the tests
and the purposes may conflict); see also RESTATEmENT 2D, supra note 30, at § 18b.
184 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 30, at § 27. See Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U.S.
457 (1925); Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118 (1882); Barcelona Traction, Light &
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tion over an enterprise belongs to the state in which the enterprise is
doing business. 165
In the Nottebohm case,'" the International Court of Justice analyzed
the circumstances under which a state legitimately could confer national-
ity upon an individual of another state. The court concluded that states
were required to recognize such grants of nationality only in instances
where a "genuine connection" between the individual and the state grant-
ing nationality existed.1 6 7
Regarding licensees of U.S. corporations, a specific question becomes
whether payment of royalties to an entity over which U.S. jurisdiction
exists is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the royalty-paying entity,
the latter residing outside the territorial bounds of the United States and
having no other link to the United States.16 8 It already has been estab-
lished in several foreign forums that U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction can-
not be predicated on U.S.-origin goods, once those goods have been dis-
charged in the territory of another country.16 9 Therefore, it would appear
that a sales agreement requiring payment for purchase of U.S.-origin
goods is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the entity making pay-
ment to the U.S. entity.
A further distinction may be drawn between goods originating in the
United States and goods produced in a country outside of the United
States, but nonetheless manufactured using U.S.-origin technical data. 70
Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. 3; RESTATEMENT TD2 supra note 146, at § 216. E.g., Convention of
Establishment, United States-France, Nov. 25, 1959, art. XIV(5), 11 U.S.T. 2398, T.LA.S.
No. 4625 (defining the nationality of a corporation as the incorporating state).
115 RESTATEmENT TD2, supra note 146, at § 418, comment c. See also REsTATEmENT
TD2, supra note 146, at § 402, comment b; RESTATEMENT TD3, supra note 148, at § 419,
comment b.
166 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 LC.J. 1.
167 Id. at 23; see also Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland
B.V., No. 82-716, slip op. (District court at the Hague, filed Sept. 17, 1982) (holding that a
treaty between U.S. and Netherlands precluded conclusion that 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c)(2)(iv)
[added by the June regulations] conferred U.S. nationality on a Netherlands corporation
wholly-owned by a United States corporation).
166 The June reexport regulations revised 15 C.F.R. § 379(a) to include in the list of
prohibited exports and reexports, the "[e]xport or reexport to the U.S.S.R., . [of] any
foreign produced direct products of U.S. technical data... if:.. . the use of the data is
contingent upon royalty payments or other compensation to, any person subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States as defined in § 385.2(c), regardless of when the data were
exported from the U.S." 47 Fed. Reg. 27,251 (1982) (emphasis added).
16" American President Lines, Ltd. v. China Mutual Trading Co., 1953 A.M.C. 1510,
1526 (Hong Kong Sup. Ct. 1953); Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Neder-
land B.V., No. 82-716, slip op. (District Court at the Hague, fied Sept. 17, 1982).
171 This very distinction was implicitly made, but ignored, in Compagnie Europeenne
des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 82-716, slip op. (District Court at the
Hague, fied Sept. 17, 1982), a suit brought by a French company against a Netherlands-
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Implicit in the June regulations' assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction
over the foreign-origin product of U.S.-origin technical data is the pre-
mise that goods and technical data possess nationalities. The problem
with this premise is that the nationality principle is essentially a principle
of allegiance. The nationality principle is properly applied to persons who
pledge their allegiance to a nation in return for the benefits of that na-
tion's citizenship or residency. Goods and technology obviously cannot
pledge their allegiance to any nation. They are not citizens that derive
benefits from a country. Thus, the nationality principle generally will not
operate in relation to goods or technical data as a basis for extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
3. The Protective Principle
According to the protective principle, a nation has jurisdiction over
any action committed outside its territory by an alien person so long as
the action is committed against the security, territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of the nation in question.7 Thus, the protective princi-
ple primarily functions to justify extraterritorial jurisdiction in situations
involving the national security of nations. The day-to-day foreign policy
concerns of nations do not rise to the level of national security concerns,
and therefore cannot justify extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction in
accordance with the protective principle of international law. The June
reexport regulations were issued as foreign policy motivated export con-
trols under section 6 of the EAA '79,11" not as national security motivated
regulations under section 5 of the EAA '79.173 Therefore, the protective
principle fails to provide an acceptable basis for the extraterritorial juris-
dictional provisions of the June regulations. 7 4
based wholly owned subsidiary of a United States corporation for breach of contract; the
sole defense asserted by the Netherlands-based subsidiary of the U.S. corporation being
that the June reexport regulations prohibited subsidiaries of U.S. companies from exporting
oil and gas related goods to the U.S.S.R. In rejecting the validity of the jurisdictional provi-
sions contained in 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c)(2)(iv) based on the international law principle of
protection or security, the court concluded that the exports to the U.S.S.R. would not have
any direct and prohibited consequences within the United States, because the goods did not
originate in the United States. The fact that the goods were able to be produced in the
Netherlands by directly applying technical data originating from the United States was not
considered.
"I RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 30, at §§ 10(c), 33(1); e.g., United States v. Pizzarusso,
388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); United States v. James-Robinson, 515
F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 494 F. Supp.
1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
173 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (Supp. IV 1980).
173 Id. at § 2404.
17" Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 82-716, slip
op. (District Court at the Hague, filed Sept. 17, 1982) (declining to hold June regulations
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In the Barcelona case," 5 Belgium attempted to extend diplomatic
protection to a foreign corporation in which Belgian nationals were ma-
jority shareholders. The action of the government of Belgium was taken
in response to the wasting of corporate assets by the Spanish Government
to the economic detriment of Belgian shareholders. The International
Court of Justice declared that the protective principle of international
law could not be used to transform the Spanish State into the insurer of
the wealth of the Belgian State. Thus, the protective principle was held
insufficient to justify an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to prevent
infliction of purely economic harm on the country asserting jurisdiction.
E. Conclusions
Promulgation of the June reexport regulations under § 6 of EAA '79
was contrary to the intent of Congress insofar as the regulations purport
to extend United States jurisdiction over foreign companies, which are
neither owned nor controlled by U.S. companies, but rather are merely
foreign licensees of U.S. companies, for acts occurring within foreign na-
tions. The EAA '79 does not expressly apply its jurisdiction so as to au-
thorize the foreign licensee jurisdiction in question. Neither the statutory
nor regulatory practice preceeding enactment of the EAA '79 contains
any instance of U.S. jurisdiction over the acts of foreign nationals com-
mitted on foreign soil, based solely on the existence of an agreement be-
tween the foreign national and a U.S. citizen or resident. Moreover, the
authorization of foreign licensee jurisdiction is not a permissible judicial
interpretation of the EAA '79 absent the expressed intent of Congress,
since the extraterritorial jurisdiction in question is contrary to interna-
tional law principles.
III. CONSEQUENCES AND REmEDIES FOR LICENSORS AN LICENSEES OF
IMPAIRED LICENSES
A. Consequences
The immediate consequences are contract cancellations and the en-
suing loss of business embodied in the lost: contracts .7 The long term
consequences include a rising U.S. trade deficit, as foreign manufacturers
avoid incorporating U.S. components into their specificationsY.7 7 U.S.
valid under the protective principle, because the regulations were not motivated by national
security concerns).
1'5 In re Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3.
1706 See H.R. REP. No. 762, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982). The Commerce Department
estimates that U.S. businesses will lose a minimum of $850 million in export contracts be-
cause of the June regulations. At least 25,000 jobs also are likely to be lost.
177 The June regulations are expected by the Commerce Department to cause U.S.
firms to lose several billions of dollars in follow-on contracts. Id.
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companies will be viewed as unreliable suppliers.1 7 8
A troublesome interim consequence is the prospect of breach of con-
tract litigation. 7 9 Suits for breach of contract are likely to be brought by
foreign licensees of U.S. technology, the Soviets 8" and businesses con-
tracting to supply the Soviets. s18 Suits may be brought against the foreign
178 Commercial insurance firms are reluctant to insure U.S.-origin goods against politi-
cal risks of nondelivery in view of the possibility of a recurrence of an episode like the
imposition of the June reexport regulations. The inability of U.S. firms to obtain such insur-
ance precludes their participation in bidding for foreign supply contracts. See H.R. REP. No.
762, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982).
H.R. 1565, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (February 22, 1983) attempts to provide indemnifica-
tion against such losses in the future by authorizing the Overseas Private Investment Corpo-
ration to issue insurance against losses incurred from the imposition of certain export con-
trols. The insurance covers: "losses incurred in the production and preparation for sale of
goods or technology on which such export controls are imposed." The parties eligible to
receive such insurance include foreign businesses wholly owned by U.S. citizens or legal en-
tities created under the laws of the United States or any state or territory of the United
States.
17M Many of the bills proposing reenactment and revision of the EAA '79 include so-
called "contract sanctity" provisions.
S. 397, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec.-S. 899-903 (Feb. 2, 1983) prohibits the
President from imposing foreign policy controls that break contracts signed prior to the
imposition of the foreign policy controls. S. 397, 98th Cong., 1st Seas. § 15 (1983). This
"contract sanctity" provision would have obviated "[tihe vast majority of the complaints
arising out of the imposition of controls on the Siberian natural gas pipeline", in the view of
its sponsor. 129 CONG. REc.-S-900 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1983) (Statement of Sen. Heinz).
H.R. 3231 adds a contract sanctity provision to the foreign policy controls section (§ 6;
50 U.S.C. app. 2405) of the EAA '79, providing that "Any export controls imposed under
this section may not affect any contract to export entered into before the date on which
such controls are imposed or any export license issued under this Act before such date."
H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111(a) (1983).
The legislation proposed by the Executive, H.R. 2500, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) and
S. 979, 98th Cong., 1st Seas. (1983), stopped short of an absolute sanctity of contract provi-
sion. The Executive proposal calls for a new subsection at the end of EAA '79 § 6 as follows:
(1) Sanctity of Contract-The President shall not prohibit or curtail the ex-
port of any good or technology that is controlled under this section if such good or
technology is to be exported pursuant to a sales contract (1) entered into before
the President places the export under control, and (2) the terms of which require
delivery of the export within 270 days after the control is imposed, except that the
President may prohibit or curtail such export if he determines that not prohibit-
ing or curtailing such export would prove detrimental to the overriding national
interests of the United States.
H.R. 2500, 98th Cong., 1st Seas. § 5(5) (April 4, 1983).
18o In the early 1960's, the Soviets apparently opted to sue the breaching party under
circumstances bearing many similarities to the present political situation. The German gov-
ernment, at the behest of the U.S. government, abrogated contracts between German corpo-
rations and the Soviets for manufacture of pipe for a Soviet oil pipeline project. A. STENT,
FROM EmmARGO TO OsTpoLrrm-THE PourncAL ECONOMY OF WEsT GERMAN-Sovwr RELA-
TIONS, 1955-1980 at 110 (1981).
181 Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A v. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 82-716, slip
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licensees in foreign tribunals and against U.S. licensors in both foreign
and U.S. courts.
A force majeur defense may prove ineffective in foreign tribunals.
The defense may not be credible in view of denials of responsibility by
the host government of the proceeding, notwithstanding that the host
government has countermanded the U.S. regulations.8 2 The defense also
may fail, because the foreign tribunal likely will refuse to recognize the
validity of the U.S. export controls. 83
B. Remedial Options8 4
1. Challenging the Export Regulations8 5
The only immediate remedy available to a party subjected to the
op. (District Court at the Hague, Sept. 17, 1982) (French corporation, under contract to
Soviets, sued its breaching supplier, a Dutch subsidiary of U.S. corporation).
182 See A. STENT, supra note 180, at 110. (German government denied responsibility
during 1962 pipe embargo); Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1982, at 37, col. 1. (British Government
denies responsibility for consequences of obedience to government ordered violation of U.S.
export regulations).
I E.g., Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 82-
716, slip op. (District Court at the Hague, decided Sept. 17, 1982).
184 Remedies between licensors and licensees to the impaired technology transfer agree-
ment are contract remedies. Detailed discussion of these remedies is beyond the scope of
this article. The typical license agreement insulates the licensor from consequences of non-
performance under the agreement by obtaining the consent of the licensee to be bound by
all valid present and future U.S. export laws and regulations. One such provision reads as
follows:
Licensee agrees to comply with the Export Administration Regulations of the
United States Department of Commerce, as they may be amended from time to
time, to the extent applicable, and hereby gives to Licensor the assurances re-
quired by Part 379 of the Regulations.
Another form taken by such provisions is as follows:
Licensee agrees that none of the Technical Data obtained pursuant to this license
shall be shipped directly or indirectly to any county, citizen, agent government, or
any other person or body contrary to law or regulations of the United States of
America.
However, the operability of clauses like the preceding two may require a determination of
the validity of the law or regulation in question, since one may be presumed not to have
agreed to abide by invalid laws or regulations. Thus, the law chosen by the parties to govern
interpretation of their agreement becomes determinative, because regulations or laws valid
in the United States may be invalid in the Netherlands, for example. See Compagnie
Europeenne Des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 82-716, slip op. (District Court
at the Hague, decided Sept. 17, 1982). Moreover, the agreement of private parties cannot
allocate extraterritorial jurisdiction between nations. Only treaties permit one nation to ex-
ert jurisdiction over events and citizens within another nation's borders. See The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. 116, 135 (1812).
188 Once the Commerce Department has begun enforcement proceedings, it become ap-
propriate to challenge on constitutional grounds of due process, the ex parte enforcement
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June reexport regulations lies in the power of federal district courts to
issue preliminary injunctive relief enjoining enforcement of such regula-
tions pending a decision on the merits of their applicability and validity.
The availability of such injunctive relief is dependent upon the ability of
the moving party to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the
ultimate merits of the challenge to the validity of such a regulation.1 8
6
The burden on the party requesting preliminary injunctive relief is espe-
cially heavy in cases bearing on the foreign policy of the United States.
187
Lacking any precedent upholding a similar challenge to the validity of
such regulations, a court is unlikely to grant preliminary injunctive relief
in these cases."88
In practical terms, the ultimate legality of future restrictions similar
to the June reexport regulations is of secondary importance in relation to
the slow pace at which the legality of future similar regulations may be
determined. Such regulations remain in effect during the time in which
their legality is challenged in the courts. Six or seven months easily could
transpire between imposition of such reexport regulations and the ulti-
mate legal determination of their illegality. The parties to impaired tech-
nology transfer licenses, or to other contracts dependent upon perform-
ance of such impaired licenses, suffer substantial hardship during this
waiting period. The experiences of the companies affected by the June
reexport regulations amply demonstrate the hardships caused by the im-
scheme of the Commerce Department. However, discussion of the constitutionality of the
enforcement procedures is beyond the scope of this article.
186 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d
841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
187 Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
18 Three separate motions for a temporary restraining order and one motion for a pre-
liminary injunction were denied under similar circumstances. Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Bal-
drige, No. 82-2385, slip op. (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1982) (Denying motion for TRO to prevent
issuance of a temporary denial order by the U.S. Department of Commerce. In denying the
motion, the court relied on, inter alia, the insufficiency of the showing of likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits of the issue of whether the June 22, 1982 regulation was beyond the
authority conferred on the President under the EAA '79); Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Bal-
drige, No. 82-2385, slip op. (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 1982) (denying motion for TRO to vacate Au-
gust 26, 1982, TDO issued by a Commerce Department Hearing Commissioner; the grounds
for the TRO motion included, inter alia, that promulgation of the June 22, 1982 regulations
was beyond the authority conferred on the President under the EAA '79; denial of the TRO
motion was predicated upon insufficient showing of likelihood of success on the merits of
the jurisdictional authority granted to the President under the EAA '79); Creusot-Loire S.A.
v. Baldrige, No. 82-2787, slip op. (D.D.C. September 29, 1982) (denying motion for TRO to
vacate TDO on grounds that promulgation of June 22, 1982 regulation was unauthorized by
the EAA '79); and Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldrige, No. 82-2385, slip op. (D.D.C. Novem-
ber 8, 1982) (denying motion for preliminary injunction; showing of success on the merits of
the issue of the legality of the June 22, 1982 regulation was deemed insufficient).
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position of retroactive reexport controls as a negotiating tool of the Presi-
dent in the foreign policy arena.
No judicial determination"s" of the validity of the June reexport reg-
ulations has occurred, because they were withdrawn 90 before any deci-
sions were rendered on their merits. No legal precedent has been ren-
dered to discourage future impositions of foreign-policy motivated
retroactive reexport regulations.29 ' The practical usefulness of such ex-
port controls as a short-term foreign-policy tool of the President has re-
mained intact. Thus, the President has maintained the option to resort
again to imposition of similar controls.
2. Remedies against the Government
The remedies available to any private party against the U.S. Govern-
ment depend initially on the consent of the sovereign to be sued. Some
statutory or constitutional grounds for relief must be found. Since Con-
gress has not seen fit to provide a statutory basis for relief from govern-
ment termination of export privileges, private parties to a contract for the
transfer of technology must turn to a constitutional basis for relief. The
most promising avenue fore relief would appear to be a suit brought
against the U.S. Government in the United States Claims Court under
the Fifth Amendment for a taking of contractual rights in furtherance of
U.S. foreign policy.19 2
" An administrative determination upheld the extraterritorial jurisdictional reach of
the June regulations as being authorized by the EAA '79. In re Dresser (France) S.A., No.
632, slip op. at 2-9 (Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration, filed Nov. 1,
1982). However, Dresser (France) was a French subsidiary wholly owned by a U.S. corpora-
tion in addition to being a licensee of the parent U.S. corporation.
190 47 Fed. Reg. 51,858 (1982).
.., See Corcoran, The Trading With the Enemy Act and the Controlled Canadian
Corporation, 14 McGELL L.J., 174, 184 (1969) (concluding that the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment avoided enforcement and licensing conflicts with foreign countries over its TWEA au-
thority in order to prevent judicial constructions and interpretation of the statute and
regulations).
192 The general rule has long been that while the Government may regulate private
property to a certain extent, if the government regulation goes too far, it will be recognized
as a taking under the Fifth Amendment. Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 415 (1922).
Contractual rights are considered property for which just compensation must be paid in
accordance with the Fifth Amendment. Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106
(1923); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508 (1922); T.A. Moynahan
Prop., Inc. v. Lancaster Village Coop., Inc., 496 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (7th Cir. 1974).
Federal agency action may result in inverse condemnation of a property interest in con-
tracts for which recovery may be obtained in a suit brought under the Tucker Act, codified
as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1980). Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106
(1923) (taking of private corporation's contract for construction of a ship by lawful requisi-
tion order of the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation).
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Such actions would be predicated upon the theory of government
usurpation of private property without payment of just compensation. 193
In accordance with the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, the Federal
Government may not take property without making just compensation to
the property owner.' 9 An agreement providing for the transfer of techni-
cal data from licensor to licensee creates contractual rights. Contract
rights are among the property interests protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment's Just Compensation Clause.195
It is certain that the United States Claims Court has jurisdiction over
takings committed by an officer or agent of the Federal Government in
the course of performing governmental duties. 98 The key question in any
Claims Court suit must be whether promulgation of the June reexport
regulations constitutes a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution. 97 However, the inquiry also may focus on the seizure
In determining when the Fifth Amendment requires that economic injuries caused by
governmental regulation be compensated by the Government, the Supreme Court has en-
gaged in factual inquiries in which the following factors have been identified as particularly
significant: (1) The economic impact of the regulation; (2) its interference with reasonable
investment backed expectation; and (3) the character of the governmental action. Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
,S Even a friendly non-resident alien is entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment against government taking without just compensation, notwithstanding that the
United States no longer recognized the country of the alien. Russian Volunteer Fleet v.
United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1931).
1" Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
195 Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106 (1923); Omnia Commercial Co.
v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508 (1922); Kearney & Trecker Coop. v. United States, 688
F.2d 780, 783 (Ct. Cl. 1982); T.A. Moynahan Prop., Inc. v. Lancaster Village Corp., Inc., 496
F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (7th Cir. 1974). But see Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. FERC, 676
F.2d 763, 778-79 n. 43 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (expressing doubt that private contractual arrange-
ments are "property" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment).
I" Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 690 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1982). (While ac-
knowledging that subject matter jurisdiction over takings resides within the Claims Court,
the D.C. Circuit made no judgment on whether a presidential cancellation of the claim pur-
suant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1603(c), 1605(a)(5)
(1976) of an Iranian hostage for damages, would constitute a taking under the Fifth Amend-
ment that was also compensable by recovery in the Claims Court pursuant to the Tucker
Act; the latter codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (1976). See also, Note, The Iranian Hostage
Agreement Under International and United States Law, 81 COLUM. L. R.v. 822, 874-75
(1981).
Though not before the court for review, the merit of the claim that federal regula-
tory action preventing receipt of contractual performance constitutes a Fifth Amendment
taking for which just compensation is due, was doubted in Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.
v. FERC, 676 F.2d 763, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Accord Omnia Commercial Co. v. United
States, 261 U.S. 502, 508 (1922) (Government frustration of receipt of performance under
contract); Cf. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. United States, 688 F.2d 780 (Ct. Cl. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983) (Government frustration of ability to perform contract).
However, in the Omnia and Kearney cases, the governmental action was not directed to
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of goods by U.S. customs agents to prevent export in accordance with the
June reexport regulations.19"
The following scenario presents one set of possible circumstances in
which action of the Executive Branch that precludes receipt of rights due
pursuant to a contract between private parties may constitute a Fifth
Amendment taking requiring the government to pay just compensation to
the owner of the contract rights. Party A contracts to provide Party B
with transport services from the U.S. to foreign nation C. In the interest
of U.S. foreign policy, the Government promulgates regulations prohibit-
ing Party A from providing the contracted transport service to foreign
country C, by requiring Party A instead to provide transport service to
country D. Assuming the legality of the regulations, it would appear that
Party A has a force majeur defense to any breach of contract action
brought by Party B. It also would appear that the only viable remedy of
Party B would be suit for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment
against the Government for the contract rights "taken" by the regulations
in question.199
IV. PRECAUTIONARY LICENSING MEASURES
In concluding licensing agreements, which would be subject to U.S.
export controls, it may be wise for the U.S.-origin licensor to provide for
an express choice of U.S. law as the law governing the agreement.20 0 How-
the plaintiff's contract with the third party. Thus, any effect on the plaintiff's contractual
rights by the governmental action in Omnia and Kearney was a consequential effect, not the
direct effect required to support an action for just compensation under the Fifth Amend-
ment. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 484 (1911). In the case of the June
Regulations,, the governmental regulation may be said to have been directed to the plain-
tiff's contract with third parties, because the applicability of the regulation in question was
predicated on the existence of the very license which the regulation deprived of the origi-
nally bargained for benefit. Thus, the Omnia and Kearney precedent would appear
distinguishable.
See also International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931); Brooks-Scanlon
Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106, 121 (1923); Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn,
166 U.S. 685, 691 (1897). (These latter three cases may not have been considered by the
D.C. Circuit panel in Con Ed. v. FERC).
"I On October 15, 1982, U.S. customs officials seized turbines manufactured by G.E.
and bound for Italy and Nuovo Pignone for use on the Algerian natural gas pipeline. Wash-
ington Post, Oct. 16, 1982, at A-20, col. 6.
I" Cf. Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S 399 (1931); Long Island Water Supply
Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897). Contra Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261
U.S. 502 (1922).
200 In American President Lines, Ltd. v. China Mutual Trading Co., 1953 A.M.C. 1510,
1519, 1525 (Hong Kong Suip. Ct. 1953), the Supreme Court of Hong Kong deferred to the
parties' choice of United States Law as governing interpretation of their rights under their
shipping agreement. In Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V.,
No. 82-716, slip op., (District Court at the Hague, Sept. 17, 1982), the Dutch court began its
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ever, such a choice of law poses disadvantages for the non-U.S.-origin li-
censee. Such a choice also is unlikely to be made when the contract is
concluded between two companies organized under the laws of nations
other than the United States. Moreover, it is equally unlikely that a non-
U.S. court would feel bound by such a choice of law even though ex-
pressed by the parties, if the court determined that the interests of the
nation providing the legal forum warranted application of the law of the
forum nation.
Force majeur clauses offer both parties to the agreement an agreed
avenue for escaping breach of contract litigation between them in the
event of nonperformance caused by retroactive reexport regulations.20 1
Most agreements currently operative include a written assurance by the
licensee to be bound by U.S. Export Administration regulations, as
changed from time to time. It is likely that such promises would be en-
forced by U.S. courts, but uncertain whether the same would be true in a
foreign tribunal. 0 2
V. DESRABILITY OF PRESIDENTL& EXERCISE OF FOREIGN-POLICY
MOTIVATED EXPORT REGULATIONS
A. Reaction of U.S. Business Community
Businessmen in the United States expressed fears that the June reg-
ulations would lessen the willingness of foreign companies to enter into
licensing or joint venture projects with U.S. companies.203
B. Reaction of Foreign Governments
One month to the day after promulgation of the June regulations, the
analysis by determining that the law to be applied to the controversy was the law of the
Netherlands. The court made this determination after first satisfying itself that the parties
themselves had made no choice of law for interpretation of their contract.
201 One form for such clauses follows:
This License shall at all times be subject to immediate termination at the
election of either party by written notice from one party to the other by registered
letter upon the occurrence of one or more of the following events:
a. The making of any payment required hereunder or the performance by
either party or any other undertaking hereunder shall be declared or found to be
illegal or impossible, by reason of any law, regulation or policy authority or by the
decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, and such illegality or impossibility
shall continue for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days.
2 See Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 82/716,
slip op. (Dist. Ct. at the Hague, Sept. 17, 1982) (Dutch court fails to accord validity to June
regulations for purpose of force majeur defense to breach of contract suit).
203 See H.R. REP. No. 762, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1982); Felix Kessler, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 27, 1982, at 21, col 1.
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French Government issued a strongly worded communique in defiance of
the regulations.2'" The communique proclaimed that "contracts entered
into by French companies for the construction of the pipeline must be
honored" and that the French Government "cannot accept the unilateral
measure taken on June 18, by the United States."
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has decried
the June regulations as "unacceptable under international law because of
their extraterritorial aspects. '20 5 The German Government also concluded
that the June Regulations "interfere with previously concluded licensing
contracts and unduly contain an element of retroactivity. '20 6
The European Community protested formally207 to the United States
on July 14, and August 12, 1982. The protests condemned the June regu-
lations for prohibiting the use of previously exported technical data to
supply European produced equipment for the Soviet natural gas pipeline.
The June regulations were labelled violations of international law because
of their extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction over businesses organized
within the European Economic Community.
1. Orders of the British and French Governments
The British Secretary of State for Trade issued an Order2 8 on June
30, 1982, under the authority of the Protection of Trading Interests Act
of 1980.209 The British Order declared that Parts 374, 376, 379, 385 and
399 of Chapter 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as modified by the
December and June Regulations, were damaging or threatening to dam-
2 The translated text of the communique of the Prime Minister of France, July 22
1982 is as follows:
The contracts entered into by French companies for the construction of the pipe-
line must be honored. The deliveries contemplated in 1982 must therefor be made
on time. The government cannot accept the unilateral measures taken on June 18
by the United States. This is also the opinion of our partners in the European
community. Such measures unduly cause commercial harm to European compa-
nies. They injure, moreover, cooperation between the United States and its allies.
20' Undated memorandum stating the position of the Government of the Federal Re-
public of Germany on the natural gas project between Western European companies and the
Soviet Union, submitted on July 30, 1982, to the Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, at p. 5.
208 Id.
207 In practical terms, the Ambassador of the European Communities to the United
States put it succinctly when he stated that as a result of the June Regulations, "foreign
buyers will be reluctant to sign up and pay for transfers of technology with what they are
bound now to consider an unreliable partner." Address by Sir Roy Denman, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce's International Forum (approx. Sept. 15, 1982).
208 The Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Reexport Control) Order 1982, STAT. INST.
1982 No. 885 (made June 30, 1982, in force July 1, 1982).
209 1980, c. 11; in force Mar. 20, 1980.
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age the trading interests of Britain insofar as the regulations affected the
export or reexport of goods from the United Kingdom. On August 2, 1982,
a second Order directed specific British corporations to refrain from com-
pliance with any U.S. Export Administration Regulations affecting ex-
ports from the United Kingdom.
The Minister of State of the French Ministry of Research and Indus-
try issued a Requisition Order for Services,21 0 which obligated a French
corporation to undertake acts in violation of the June regulations.
C. Considerations of Comity and Foreign Government Compulsion
Multinational corporations often find themselves subjected to con-
flicting laws of different nations. These conflicts must be resolved, if in-
ternational commerce is to flourish. One way to resolve these conflicts is
for governments to recognize the principle of comity among nations when
dealing with parties and events on an international scale.2 1 ' The idea of
national forbearance in international commerce is by no means novel. 21 2
However, movement towards practical acceptance of this doctrine might
be described as glacial.
In recent years, nations have become determined to resist assertions
of extraterritorial jurisdiction by other nations. Statutes have been en-
acted to address this problem of nations attempting to assert extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction over parties and events within the territories of other na-
tions.21 3 The antitrust laws of the United States in particular have incited
enactment of several foreign statutes designed to frustrate the ability of
litigants in U.S. federal courts to obtain financial information from or en-
force judgments against parties residing in foreign nations.214
21o The Order was issued pursuant to Ordinance No. 59.63 of Jan. 6, 1959 and Decree
No. 62.367 of Mar. 26, 1962.
m See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) ("We cannot have
trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms,
governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.").
212 In the early 1950's, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed itself on this subject-
[I]n dealing with international commerce, we cannot be unmindful of the necessity
for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided; nor should we forget that
any contact which we hold sufficient to warrant application of our law to a foreign
transaction will logically be as strong a warrant for a foreign country to apply its
law to an American transaction.
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
213 E.g., The Foreign Boycott legislation of the United States, codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2407 (Supp. IV 1980).
214 See British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, in force Mar. 20, 1980;
J.O. 1980 No. 538 (French law forbidding export of economic, commercial, industrial,
financial, or technical information); Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence)
Act 1976, Austl. Acts No. 121 (1976) (Australian law permitting imposition of restrictions on
production of documents for foreign tribunals likely to exercise jurisdiction contrary to in-
1983
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
The trade laws of different nations offer many opportunities for con-
flict.2 15 In practical application of the law to such conflict areas, courts
have developed principles which accord due, deference to actions of busi-
nesses mandated by compliance with foreign host-nation trade laws.2 16
D. Conclusion
Extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction are incidents of a broad
trend toward interdependence among nations.2 17 In today's world, the ef-
fects of events cannot easily be confined to a particular geographical
place. These extraterritorial effects create internal pressure on nations to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over the causative events. Conflicts be-
tween local and extraterritorial authorities become inevitable in such an
environment. Resolution of such conflicts is stymied by the lack of a sin-
gle international body recognized as having authority to adjudicate these
conflicts.2 1 8
ternational law or comity); Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act
1979, Austl. Acts No. 13 (1979) (Australian law protecting Australian companies from anti-
trust judgments rendered by foreign courts pursuant to jurisdiction exercised in a manner
inconsistent with international law or comity); Sections 31.5 and 31.6 of the Combines In-
vestigation Act. CAN. Ray. STAT. ch. C-23 (1970), amended by Ch. 76 § 12, 1974-1975-1976
Can. Stat. 1535 (§ 31.5 prohibits foreign decrees injurious to the commercial interests of
Canada, and § 31.6 prohibits foreign parent corporations from giving effect to foreign laws
by orders directed to Canadian subsidiaries). See also Business Records Protection Act,
ONT. Rav. STAT. ch. 56 §§ 1-3 (1980) (prohibiting removal from Ontario of business records
at the behest of governmental authorities outside Ontario).
215 See Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 1 All E. R. 434 (discov-
ery problems related to antitrust suits). In the words of Lord Wilberforce, "It is axiomatic
that in antitrust matters the policy of one state may be to defend what it is the policy of
another state to attack." Id. at 448.
216 Timberland'Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976) (re-
ferring to the "often-recognized principle that corporate conduct which is compelled by a
foreign sovereign is also protected from antitrust liability, as if it were an act of the state
itself"); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D.
Del. 1970) ("When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there have no choice but to obey.
Acts of business become effectively acts of the sovereign."); United States v. Watchmakers
of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 at 77,456
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (when "the defendant's activities had been required by Swiss law, this court
[may] do nothing."); see also Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); REsTATEmENT 2D supra note 30, at 40.
217 See Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trad-
ing Interests Act, 1980, 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 257, 281 (1981) (recognizing the link between
economic interdependence and the resolution of questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction).
218 See Marcuss and Butland, Reconciling National Interests in the Regulation of In-
ternational Business, 1 Nw. J. ,r'L L. & Bus. 349 (1979) (identifying and discussing two
schools of international conflict resolution, the comity school and the international agree-




The impetus for the creation of such a body must come from the
powerful economic incentives posed by the impairment and loss of inter-
national trade in the present environment of conflicting assertions of ju-
risdiction by trading nations.219 The machinery for this body already may
exist under the auspices of the United Nations and the International
Court of Justice at the Hague. The political concessions required to con-
fer the necessary authority on either of these bodies are analogous to
those made by the nations forming the European Economic Community.
In its present stage of development, the United Nations may be con-
stituted too diversely to develop the needed consensus on the economic
principles underpinning the decision-making authority of an international
adjudicatory body.220 The model of the European Economic Community
appears more suited to reaching the political and economic consensus re-
quired before such an international adjudicatory body can be charged
with the authority needed to resolve jurisdictional conflicts between indi-
vidual nations.
The immediate beneficiaries of the formation of such an adjudicatory
forum would be the multinational businesses and other companies en-
gaged in international trade. The certainty eventually afforded by such an
international forum for adjudication of jurisdictional disputes should pro-
mote international trade to the eventual advantage of all participating
nations.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Foreign policy motivated reexport controls tend to be imposed by the
Executive for their coercive effects. Their imposition requires an extrater-
ritorial assertion of U.S. jurisdiction. In basing such assertions upon the
existence of a private agreement for transferring U.S.-origin technology to
a foreign national for use within a foreign nation to produce foreign-origin
goods, such assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction exceed the jurisdic-
tional grounds recognized under the principles of international law. Such
extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction are invalid under the laws of for-
eign nations. The EAA '79, while intended to have some extraterritorial
jurisdictional reach, did not provide expressly for jurisdiction over foreign
licensees of U.S.-origin technology. Some degree of Congressional acquies-
2" See Comment, A Turnabout in Extraterritoriality, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 593
(1982) (outlining the possibility that the U.S. and Europe might come to terms on jurisdic-
tion by either adopting an agreed neutral standard or allocating responsibility to a joint
agency).
120 For the view that diversely constituted international forums provide little opportu-
nity for formulating an effective consensus, see Hacking, The Increasing Extraterritorial
Impact of U.S. Laws: A Cause for Concern Amongst Friends of America, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 1, 10 (1979).
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cence in the unprecedented extraterritorial assertion of United States ju-
risdiction has been demonstrated. It also has been demonstrated that, all
questions of their validity under U.S. law aside, such extraterritorial as-
sertions of U.S. jurisdiction have adverse consequences for United States
Government and business. They disrupt normal trade relationships be-
tween U.S. and foreign businesses. They detract from the reliability, and
therefore the competitiveness, of U.S. businesses engaged in international
commerce. They embroil the United States and its allies in exacerbating
jurisdictional squabbles, unduly preoccupying diplomatic resources.
In the final analysis, the damage done to relations between the
United States and its allies would appear to outweigh the efficacy of such
regulations in achieving any given foreign policy goal. Thus, imposition of
further reexport controls should be avoided, either by forbearance by the
President, by nullification of imposed regulations by the courts, or prefer-
ably by prohibition of such regulations through legislation. Consideration
also should be given to the creation of a neutral international body em-
powered to enforce its decisions resolving the conflicting jurisdictional
claims of separate nations. In the meantime, U.S. licensors and foreign
licensees should provide in their agreements for the contingent disruption
of their agreements by sudden changes in the U.S. export laws.
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